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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to shed light on the political ambitions of
Agamben’s book The Time That Remains. First, the article examines
Agamben’s political messianism in The Time That Remains by tak-
ing into account the question of political theology. Second, the
article elaborates on a number of important concepts and ideas
that are at the forefront of Agamben’s political messianism. Third,
the author elucidates the general framework within which one has
to view Agamben’s political messianism. In the fourth and last part
of the article, the author assesses the innovative nature of
Agamben’s political messianism by sketching out a comparison
between The Time That Remains and Heidegger’s phenomenologi-
cal interpretation of Paul the apostle.
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Agamben’s book The Time That Remains is more than an exegetical exercise. The book
is characterized not only by a complex intertwining of historical–philological analyses
and philosophical considerations, but also by political claims, which are explicit only to
a certain extent. The aim of this article is to shed light on the political ambitions of
Agamben’s Pauline book by analyzing them in view of the messianism that comes to the
fore at critical junctures of his commentary. This analysis is based on three thematic
axes, whose integration is expected to display the political core of Agamben’s reading of
Paul. The three thematic axes correspond to the ﬁrst three parts of the present
contribution.
First, I examine Agamben’s political messianism in The Time That Remains by
taking into account the question of political theology. The talk of political messianism
implies that the political and the theological (or religious) are somehow intertwined. It
is precisely this intersection of religion and politics that is at stake in the discourse of
political theology. In this context, one has to mention at least two authors who are of
decisive importance for Agamben’s understanding of Paul: Carl Schmitt and Jacob
Taubes. Thus, my analysis concentrates on how Agamben appropriates and reformu-
lates a number of theses on political theology that have been worked out especially by
Schmitt and Taubes. This ﬁrst step allows me to describe the general theological–
political tone that deﬁnes Agamben’s political messianism.
Second, I elaborate on a number of important concepts and ideas that are at the
forefront of Agamben’s political messianism. In doing so, I concentrate my attention on
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the double face of those concepts and ideas, that is, the synergy of the political and the
theological. It is worth noticing that this synergy characterizes Agamben’s genealogical
approach to the history of ideas. When interpreting philosophical, historical, juridical,
and literary sources, Agamben highlights the multiple dimensions of ideas and concepts
and tries to overcome one-sided understandings of them. In doing so, he attempts to
reveal the religious aspect implicit in political ideas, or by the same token, the political
import of notions that seem to have an exclusively religious importance.
Third, I elucidate the general framework within which one has to view Agamben’s
political messianism. This framework is the philosophical project he initiated with his
book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. I intend to show how Agamben’s
Pauline political messianism can be understood both as an attempt to answer a number
of crucial questions he poses in the book Homo Sacer, and as a decisive intermediate
step towards solutions he outlines in later publications. In this connection, I document
the extent to which Agamben considers the Pauline letters sources of inspiration for
developing a new philosophical understanding in order to confront the momentous
challenges facing contemporary society as we transition from the twentieth century to
the twenty-ﬁrst century.
In the fourth and last part of this article, I assess the innovative nature of Agamben’s
political messianism by sketching out a comparison between The Time That Remains
and Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Paul.1 There are many reasons
why such a comparison can help us better understand the extent to which Agamben has
opened up new horizons for the philosophical reception of the Pauline letters in
contemporary European thought. At ﬁrst sight, Heidegger’s reading and Agamben’s
commentary are very similar because they both emphasize, albeit in diﬀerent ways, the
particular experience of time that characterizes the Pauline apostleship.2 On closer
inspection, however, one can easily notice a substantial diﬀerence. While Heidegger
pays no attention to the political implications of the Pauline letters, Agamben’s reading
captures the political connotations of Paul’s apostleship. I try to explain this intriguing
diﬀerence by highlighting its philosophical reason, which, according to my interpretive
hypothesis, lies in the diﬀerent conceptions of life Heidegger and Agamben presuppose
in their respective analyses of Paul. Heidegger conceives of life as facticity that is in
essence deprived of any political signiﬁcance. For his part, Agamben elaborates on the
question of life on the basis of the conception he worked out in Homo Sacer, according
to which life has to be understood in its original political import.
Agamben and political theology
The analysis of Agamben’s political messianism has ﬁrst to answer the question of how
Agamben conceives the relationship between the political and the theological. In this
section, I intend to show that Agamben does not subordinate the political to the
theological; nor does he think that the theological is derivative of the political; rather,
he traces both the political and the theological back to a more encompassing founda-
tional domain. If one takes into account Carl Schmitt’s understanding of political
theology, according to which modern political concepts derive from a secularization
of Christian theology,3 one can easily see that Agamben’s account of the relation
between the political and the theological oﬀers a more nuanced solution, which does
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not imply any deﬁnite decision about the possible hierarchical relations between these
two domains. However, a preliminary investigation into how Agamben reads Schmitt
and another major ﬁgure in political theology, Jacob Taubes, provides interesting
clariﬁcations.
At ﬁrst sight, the inﬂuence of Jacob Taubes on Agamben’s Pauline commentary is
quantitatively negligible. Agamben mentions Taubes and his book The Political
Theology of Paul at the very beginning of his commentary.4 This is the sole relevant
mention, the others turn out to be mere references concerning very speciﬁc exegetical
questions. On closer inspection, however, this incipient mention of Taubes deserves
attention. Not only does Agamben dedicate his commentary to Taubes in memoriam,
but he also informs us that Taubes’s book marks a truly signiﬁcant ‘turning point’ in
scholarship on the Pauline letters because, according to Agamben, Taubes has been able
to sense the messianic core of Paul’s apostleship.5 In this context, Agamben does not
elaborate on the link between political theology and the messianic. However, as will
become clear in what follows, it is precisely messianism that constitutes the horizon
within which the question of political theology, or the question of the relationship
between the political and the theological, is re-addressed by Agamben in a new way.
The inﬂuence of Carl Schmitt on Agamben’s Pauline commentary is also quantita-
tively negligible, but, on closer inspection, it has an immense qualitative impact on
Agamben’s analysis of the Pauline epistles. As a matter of fact, Agamben uses Carl
Schmitt to clarify the meaning and scope of Paul’s messianic deactivation (katargēsis) of
the law.6 According to Agamben, the Pauline deactivation of the law is one of the most
conspicuous and momentous expressions of the general messianic attitude that ﬁnds
expression in Paul’s letters and is linked to the other main components of Paul’s
apostleship, that is, the hōs mē (‘as not’) and the performativity of faith.7 Agamben
does not conﬁne himself to an ad hoc use of Schmitt’s thought. Even more remarkably,
he uses Schmitt’s thesis (i.e. modern political concepts are secularizations of Christian
theology) against Schmitt himself. In this connection, the crucial text passage reads as
follows:
How should we think the state of the law under the eﬀect of messianic katargēsis? What is
a law that is simultaneously suspended and fulﬁlled? In answering this question, I found
there to be nothing more helpful than the epistemological paradigm at the center of the
work of a jurist who developed his conception of law and the sovereign state according to
an explicitly anti-messianic constellation. But for this very reason, insofar as he is, in
Taubes’s words ‘an apocalypticist of counterrevolution’, he cannot help but introduce
some genuinely messianic theologoumena into it. According to Schmitt, whom you will
have already indentiﬁed without my naming him, the paradigm that deﬁnes the proper
functioning and structure of the law is not the norm, but the exception.8
The passage contains a surprising change of perspective that cannot be overestimated.
Initially, Agamben asks how one has to conceive of the condition of the law when
messianic deactivation comes into play, so that the law is at once ‘suspended and fulﬁlled’.
To clarify this seemingly paradoxical condition of the deactivated law, Agamben refers to
Schmitt, but immediately afterwards, he argues that it is Schmitt himself who makes use of
messianic concepts. In other words, Agamben wants to clarify Paul by using Schmitt, but
he ends up using Paul to clarify Schmitt. Thus, if we carry the passage to an extreme, we
could say that it is Schmitt himself that is one of the examples of the secularization of
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theological concepts that deﬁnes modern politics. In fact, what Schmitt conceptualizes as
the condition of the law within the state of exception coincides with the condition of the
law when it is deactivated through the messianic.
The puzzling change of perspective performed by Agamben is conﬁrmed by the way
in which he elaborates on the structural convergences between exception and messianic
deactivation. First, he summarizes Schmitt’s theory of exception; then, he goes on
showing the correspondences between the main features of exception and the Pauline
account of the deactivated law. Thus, in the wake of Schmitt, Agamben focuses on three
main aspects of exception, which he phrases in terms of ‘inclusive exclusion’,9 a notion
that famously plays a pivotal role in other major publications by Agamben, especially in
Homo Sacer and State of Exception.10
The ﬁrst aspect, which directly derives from the intrinsic logic of exception under-
stood in terms of an inclusive exclusion, is the lack of distinction between the outside
and the inside, as is especially apparent in ‘the paradox of sovereignty’.11 The second
relevant point of the state of exception is the indistinction between the violation of the
law and the application of it. Accordingly, given the suspension of the law, one does not
know how to execute the law. Finally, the third meaningful aspect is that the law cannot
be formulated at all. This means that the suspension of the law does not result in the
statement of new prescriptions or obligations, that is, the old law is not replaced with a
new one. When explaining the structural correspondences between the messianic
condition of the law and the state of exception (i.e. between the messianic deactivation
of the law and the suspension of the law), Agamben thinks of the ‘indiscernability’
between the outside and the inside in terms of an indistinction between those who
follow the law and those who are outside the law.12 Thus, Paul’s messianic deactivation,
which is based on pistis (i.e. faith, belief, or conviction), does not allow for any
boundaries between Jews and non-Jews. This is precisely the radical novelty Agamben
attributes to Paul’s apostleship.
Shall we conclude that, in his reading of Paul, Agamben intends to trace back the
political (i.e. the political notion of exception) to the theological (i.e. Paul’s under-
standing of the law)? Agamben’s position is actually more complex and ambiguous.
One cannot argue that Agamben is trying to provide religious or quasi-religious
foundations of the political. For some characteristics of the messianic he highlights in
his Pauline commentary – especially the structure of exception – are also outlined
independently of the Pauline letters, albeit in diﬀerent forms, in the book Homo Sacer.
Thus, it seems that he discovers in Paul structures that can also be found in non-
Christian documents. From this point of view, Paul’s messianism would be just one
manifestation of a deeper and more fundamental dimension. Accordingly, we cannot
argue that Agamben articulates the question of political theology in terms of the
secularization pointed out by Schmitt. Nonetheless, there are examples in Agamben’s
book on Paul that are very close to Schmitt’s secularization thesis. It is helpful to brieﬂy
mention two of them at least.
Agamben points out the fact that Marxism entails elements that derive from a
secularization of the messianic:
Benjamin’s thesis, that the Marxian concept of a ‘classless society’ is a secularization of the
idea of messianic time, is obviously pertinent to us here. We will therefore attempt to take
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Dionysius’s etymology seriously for a short moment in bringing together the function of
messianic klēsis for Paul with the function of class for Marx. Just as class represents the
dissolution of all ranks and the emergence of a split between the individual and his own
social condition, so too does messianic klēsis signify the hollowing out and nulliﬁcation of
all juridical-factical conditions through the form of the as not.13
Agamben argues that ‘Marx’s secularization of the messianic seems to me to be accurate
and precise, up to this point’.14 However, it is important to avoid rushed conclusions. In
my opinion, when visualizing the link between Marxism and Pauline messianism,
Agamben does not want to suggest that the actual meaning of Pauline messianism
lies in revolution. Pauline messianism is not revolutionary if we understand revolution
in the way modernity understands it. The ‘nulliﬁcation of all juridical–factical condi-
tions’ Pauline messianism is supposed to signify does not mean the actual ‘dissolution
of all ranks’. In other words, Pauline messianism does not want to destroy factual social,
juridical, and political conditions but intends to experience them through the ﬁlter of
the hōs mē.
Agamben also uses Schmitt’s secularization thesis with regard to Hegel’s notion of
sublation (Aufhebung), which he traces back, via Luther’s translation, to Paul’s notion of
deactivation. Here, Schmitt’s thesis is used to display the hidden theological core of
Hegel’s philosophy:
That Hegel’s dialectic is nothing more than a secularization of Christian theology comes as
no surprise; however, more signiﬁcant is the fact that (with a certain degree of irony)
Hegel used a weapon against theology furnished by theology itself and that this weapon is
genuinely messianic.15
This short passage contains at least three theses that cannot be overestimated in the
context of Agamben’s Pauline commentary. As already said, the ﬁrst thesis is that
Hegel’s dialectic is a secularization of Christian theology. This point is neither new
nor surprising, as Agamben himself admits. However, he substantiates this thesis with a
new insight into the concept of sublation by tracing it back to Pauline katargēsis.
The second thesis is that Hegel uses a secularized theological concept against theology
itself. In my opinion, Agamben refers to the fact that the dialectical logic based on
sublation allows Hegel to attribute to philosophy a more foundational role than that of
religion and theology, which means that at the end of the dialectical process they are
both absorbed in the absolute self-knowledge of the spirit. The third thesis is even more
fascinating because it can be applied to Agamben himself. Here, the crucial point is that
the secularized instrument of sublation – secretly theological and used by Hegel against
theology itself – is actually messianic in nature. What does Agamben mean with his
claim to display the messianic core of Hegel’s dialectic? He outlines the following
genealogy: The Pauline deactivation of the law has an original messianic meaning. In
the course of the history of Christianity, however, such a messianic meaning has been
lost because theology (i.e. the institutionalized theological doctrines) disempowered the
genuinely messianic element of Paul’s apostleship.16 When Hegel incorporates the
Pauline deactivation of the law into his philosophical system, he does not conﬁne
himself to the philosophical secularization of Paul’s account of deactivation, but his
use of it is messianic precisely because it is anti-theological. In other words, it is not a
mere dialectical process within theology itself. Regardless of whether Agamben’s
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messianic interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic is plausible or not, in this context the
crucial point is that Agamben’s approach to Pauline messianism is not that far from
what he attributes to Hegel himself. What is Agamben actually doing with his com-
mentary on the letter to the Romans? He is indeed rediscovering the original meaning
of Pauline messianism, with the intention of using the rediscovered core of messianism
while highlighting the limits of theological discourse itself. In the ﬁnal analysis, in
Agamben’s eyes, his reversal of Schmitt’s secularization thesis has an instrumental
function as his actual aim is to point out precisely the ‘zone of indistinction’ where
the theological and the political enigmatically and ambiguously overlap.17
Agamben’s attempt to challenge and supplement Schmitt’s thesis is clearly attested
by his approach in another book that belongs to the Homo Sacer cycle, which is The
Kingdom and the Glory. In that context, he explicitly refers to Schmitt’s secularization
thesis:
In 1922, Carl Schmitt encapsulated the theological-political paradigm in a lapidary thesis:
‘All signiﬁcant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological
concepts’ (Schmitt 2005, p. 36). If our hypothesis about the existence of a double paradigm
is correct, this statement should be supplemented in a way that would extend its validity
well beyond the boundaries of public law, extending up to the fundamental concepts of the
economy and the very idea of the reproductive life of human societies. However, the thesis
according to which the economy could be a secularized theological paradigm acts retro-
actively on theology itself, since it implies that from the beginning theology conceives
divine life and the history of humanity as an oikonomia, that is, that theology is itself
‘economic’ and did not simply become so at a later time through secularization.18
This crucial passage supports my interpretive hypothesis according to which Agamben
signiﬁcantly changes the perspective when approaching Schmitt’s thesis. It is worth
noticing that in this case his approach concerns not only the political, the theological,
and the juridical, but also the economic. As a matter of fact, his analysis does not end
up in a mere reversal of Schmitt’s thesis but, more precisely, in a genealogical view on
the origin of those distinctions themselves. Such an analysis is fully in line with the
‘topological’19 method Agamben adheres to in Homo Sacer, where he aims to proble-
matize a number of allegedly self-evident diﬀerentiations by pointing out what he calls a
‘zone of indistinction’.20 At this juncture, it is useful to take into account some concrete
examples with particular reference to Agamben’s commentary on the Pauline letters.
Agamben’s genealogy of political–theological concepts
In the ﬁrst part of this article, I showed how Agamben challenges and supplements
Schmitt’s secularization thesis and reformulates it to oﬀer a new reading of the Pauline
account of the law. In this part, I want to elaborate on the role deactivation plays within
the framework of Pauline messianism. This topic provides a good example of how
Agamben concretely conceives the relationship between the political and the
theological.
The similarity between the Pauline deactivation of the law and the state of exception
can be documented by viewing the former in the light of speciﬁc features of Paul’s
messianic experience, especially the hōs mē and Paul’s messianic vocation, which
Agamben understands in terms of ‘the revocation of every vocation’.21 The link between
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Paul’s messianic vocation and the state of exception becomes particularly apparent in
the following passage:
The messianic vocation is not a right, nor does it furnish an identity; rather, it is a generic
potentiality [potenza] that can be used without ever being owned. To be messianic, to live
in the Messiah, signiﬁes the expropriation of each and every juridical-factical property
(circumcised/uncircumcised; free/slave; man/woman) under the form of the as not. This
expropriation does not, however, found a new identity.22
The crucial term in the passage is ‘potentiality’. The messianic deactivation of juridical–
factical conditions does not result in a new identity, that is, in the actualization of new
conditions. If this were the case, certain actualized factical conditions would be replaced
with other actualized conditions. Yet Agamben stresses precisely the fact that the
messianic does not introduce ‘a new identity’. Indeed, the speciﬁc feature of the
messianic is that it cannot ever be exhausted by the actualization of new properties.
Otherwise, the messianic would turn out to be just one factical element among others.
In this context, Agamben links the messianic to two pivotal notions that deﬁne his
approach to Paul, that is, the notion of use and that of expropriation. If the messianic
does not found a new identity and does not replace certain factical conditions with
other ones, it actually consists in an expropriation. Expropriation does not mean,
however, the loss of factical–juridical properties, but rather a diﬀerent way of experien-
cing them by means of the ﬁlter of the hōs mē. Accordingly, one does not lose her or his
properties and social, economic, political, etc., conditions. They are still there, but she
or he lives and experiences them from the point of view of the hōs mē. They are not her
or his belongings, nevertheless she or he uses them. The condition of using factical
conditions and properties without possessing them can be described as analogous to the
state of exception. Let us elaborate on the structural analogies between the messianic
experience of the world and the state of exception.
The ﬁrst thing one can notice is that the state of exception does not destroy or
abolish the law, rather it deactivates the normal juridical situation; the law is still
present but as suspended law, that is, a law that is not being executed.23 The same
applies to the factical conditions experienced by means of the hōs mē. Those conditions
are not abolished or destroyed but suspended in an intermediate state between full
possession and complete dismissal.
Second, it is important to understand why Agamben is using the word ‘expropria-
tion’ to characterize the messianic use of properties, things, and qualities. In this
context, expropriation cannot be understood as alienation, that is, an act of transferring
properties, things, and qualities to another. One gives up ownership, but she or he
keeps using these things nonetheless. Thus, expropriation is an intermediate state
between full ownership and alienation. In accordance with Agamben’s reading, excep-
tion means precisely an intermediate state between inclusion and exclusion, in the sense
that it is an inclusion by means of an exclusion.24
Third, both in the state of exception and in the messianic experience of the world,
the law is deactivated. Neither one of these conditions implies the destruction or
abolishment of the law. In the state of exception, the law itself allows for its own
suspension, so that it no longer applies.25 In the messianic, the law is not abolished but
is deactivated in such a way that it is fulﬁlled at the same time. As Agamben points out,
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there is no opposition between pistis (faith) and nomos (law), but what seems to be an
opposition is actually an interplay within a more fundamental dimension.26
In order to explain this important point, it is useful to summarize Agamben’s
understanding of Pauline pistis.27 This analysis, too, shows the intertwining between
the political and the theological in which Agamben is most interested. Agamben’s
genealogy of the notion of pistis provides, in fact, a further example of the extent to
which Agamben wants to clarify basic concepts of traditional religious and political
vocabulary by tracing them back to their own emergence from a ‘zone of indistinction’,
in which the political, the juridical, and the theological are intertwined. This way of
proceeding seems to be quite counterintuitive. One would expect the opposite, that is, a
clariﬁcation that disentangles the multiple connotations of the ideas to be examined.
Nevertheless, the strength of Agamben’s genealogical method lies precisely in that he
shows how the seemingly obvious approach does not succeed in explaining the relation-
ship these areas have with one another. In other words, a genealogical approach is more
fruitful than a synchronic analysis that pays attention to the already established mean-
ings of words and notions:
since pistis is tightly bound up in its origin with oath and only takes on the technical-
juridical meaning of ‘guarantee’ and ‘credit’ later on, it then it comes from this same
obscure prehistoric background. Even more signiﬁcantly, this means that when Paul sets
pistis against law, he does not intend to set a new and luminous element against the
‘antiquity of the nomos’. Rather, he plays one element of prelaw against the other, or, at the
very least, he tries to disentangle two elements that present themselves as being tightly
interwoven at their origin.28
Thus, even if Agamben seems to follow Schmitt in detecting secularized notions, he is
more nuanced when he goes back to the primordial dimension in which both the
political and the theological are rooted.
This strategy is at work at several critical junctures in other writings by Agamben.
The most important example is the notion of homo sacer (sacred man). At ﬁrst glance,
this notion seems to have a religious origin. However, Agamben explicitly rejects an
exclusively religious emergence arguing that the notion becomes clear only when it is
also considered in light of its juridical and political implications.29 Agamben tries to do
justice to the complexity of the notion of homo sacer by emphasizing the fact that homo
sacer inherently implies a double exception, with regard to the human law (ius
humanum) as well as the divine law (ius divinum).30 On the one hand, homo sacer is
exceptional with reference to the human law in that someone can kill another without
committing homicide. Thus, homo sacer is included in the human community precisely
by the fact that homicide does not apply to her or him. On the other hand, homo sacer
is exceptional in relation to the divine law because she or he may not be sacriﬁced
within the frame of a ritual.31 Thus, the enigma of homo sacer is located at the
intersection between the political and the religious, neither an exclusively political
issue nor a solely religious problem. More interestingly, according to Agamben’s
genealogical approach, this enigma allows us to see more clearly juridical patterns
that shape contemporary political orders. For example, think of the exceptional status
of presidents or kings in contemporary Western democracies or constitutional mon-
archies. The fact that presidents and kings may not be subject to ordinary trials and the
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fact that killing a president or a king is usually regarded as more than a homicide are
traces of the ancestral intertwining between the political, the religious, and the
juridical.32
It is worth noticing the double function of Agamben’s genealogical approach, which
is very consistent with the messianic task of his own philosophical project. The
genealogy of homo sacer does not have a merely antiquarian meaning but is instru-
mental to an understanding of new forms of homo sacer in the contemporary world.33
In other words, his genealogy provides a diagnosis and at the same time an etiology of
current political and social diseases aﬀecting our age. But Agamben’s genealogy is also
expected to oﬀer therapies in that it can rediscover possibilities in our tradition that
have been forgotten or distorted. Messianism, especially as presented by Agamben in its
Pauline fashion, is a latent force that genealogy reactivates with a view to ﬁnding
solutions to current problems. It is no exaggeration to say that Agamben’s genealogy,
as articulated in the books that belong to the Homo Sacer cycle, is a political act that he
expects will show a way out of the biopolitical management of homines sacri.
The execution of Agamben’s genealogy is not that far from the function he ascribes
to the messianic. Agamben presents the messianic as an element that breaks with the
established political and juridical orders. Similarly, Agambenian genealogy is supposed
to break with allegedly ﬁxed concepts and ideas by showing their origin and especially
the intertwining of juridical, political, and theological connotations that have forged
them. And yet, the relation between the messianic and genealogy is more than similarity
or analogy. When one reads the ﬁrst pages and the last pages of Agamben’s Pauline
book, one realizes that Agamben’s messianic appropriation of Paul is expected to show
a new way of understanding the political and the religious in order to break the gridlock
of the contemporary world.34
The question of life: Pauline political messianism and the Homo Sacer cycle
Agamben’s book on Paul is not included in the Homo Sacer cycle. Nevertheless, it
contains important links with the philosophical project Agamben started in 1995
with the publication of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. The political
messianism Agamben outlines in his Pauline book is an attempt to answer the
questions he poses in Homo Sacer and an anticipation of themes on which he
elaborates in his writings published in the last few years. A clear example is the
category of potentiality. Both in his Pauline commentary and in Homo Sacer,
Agamben comments on language in the light of potentiality.35 This may be under-
stood as a further conﬁrmation of the theoretical ties that connect the two books.
More remarkably, potentiality plays a central role in an analysis of the relationship
between constituted and constituting power.36 This problem is crucial in under-
standing the theoretical background against which Agamben more or less explicitly
highlights the political scope of the messianic. Constituted power is another face of
actuality, that is, of what needs to be deactivated. In his book on Paul, Agamben
does not mention the question. However, the problem is still in play when Agamben
argues that the messianic can serve as a renewing force in order to overcome (i.e.
deactivate) rigidiﬁed social, juridical, and political orders.37
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Concerning the question of constituted and constituting power, I ﬁnd Agamben’s
use of Schmitt’s framework of exception to be problematic because he does employ it to
explain the role of sovereignty in biopolitical modernity and to describe messianic
deactivation. If they both end up with a suspension of the law (i.e. sovereign exception
and Pauline katargēsis), then it is not clear the extent to which the Pauline deactivation
of the law can act against sovereign exception. It seems to me that in his commentary
on Paul Agamben is still looking for a new conception of potentiality that is supposed
to explain the nature of the messianic and, at the same time, cannot be reduced to the
potentiality speciﬁc to the sovereign exception. Nonetheless, the Pauline book contains
interesting elaborations that point to a possible solution. Let us focus on them.
At ﬁrst look, the messianic can be identiﬁed as a form of constituting power. But this
is inaccurate and is not in line with Agamben’s intention. On closer inspection, in
Homo Sacer Agamben argues that it is necessary to break with the circularity that
characterizes the interplay between constituting and constituted power.38 According to
him, a new form of power is much needed, and in this connection, he tries to take
inspiration from Walter Benjamin’s concept of divine violence.39 In Homo Sacer,
however, Agamben does not come to a ﬁnal answer. Instead, the Pauline commentary
shows a more deﬁnite step forward. In fact, the messianic seems to be a very suitable
candidate to break the circular interplay between constituting and constituted power. In
later publications, Agamben speaks of ‘destituent power’.40 In a recent interview, in
which Agamben seems to suggest a solution for Europe’s current crisis,41 the link is
made very explicit indeed. Pauline messianism and ‘destituent power’ are in fact
nothing but diﬀerent names for the same renewing force Agamben deems necessary
for enacting new forms of politics. Let us outline Agamben’s answer to the question of
how the messianic or ‘destituent power’ can break the circularity of power.
In Homo Sacer, Agamben frames the question of life in a triangle: qualiﬁed life,
natural life, and bare life.42 Agamben conceives the Aristotelian opposition between bios
and zoē in terms of the distinction between qualiﬁed life, that is, the life that has been
shaped in a certain way – especially with regard to the political community – and the
natural life shared by humans and the other living beings. At the beginning of Homo
Sacer, natural life and bare life seem to overlap and almost coincide.43 On closer
inspection, however, a basic diﬀerence between natural life and bare life comes to the
fore so that bare life, that is, the life of homo sacer, is precisely the zone of indistinction
between qualiﬁed life and natural life and, more importantly, the zone where the
political emerges.44 In other words, bare life, understood as the life of homo sacer as
distinct from natural life in the widest sense of the word, is the condition of the
possibility of sovereignty, in that the sovereign constitutes itself precisely in relation
to bare life, which turns out to be the life exposed to sovereign violence.45 More
precisely, on the one hand, bare life is the object of the sovereign, that is, what is
subject to the sovereign. On the other hand, the sovereign also constitutes itself in terms
of homo sacer due to its exceptional nature, which I have already mentioned earlier.46
Thus, it seems that life is necessarily embedded in this triangular framework, with
the result being that life does not seem to escape sovereignty. However, it is precisely in
his reading of Paul that Agamben starts to see a fourth possibility, which indeed can be
considered as a way of breaking both with the triangular framework of sovereignty and
with the circular interplay between constituting and constituted power. This fourth
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possibility is precisely a ‘destituent’ form of life. How does a destituent or messianic
form of life act towards the sovereign? The messianic form of life does not intend to
introduce a new form of sovereignty, so it never acts as a new form of constituting
power, which is fated to become another form of constituted power sooner or later. It is
precisely for this reason that Agamben rejects any attempt to institutionalize the
messianic.47 He considers a messianic institution as a contradiction in terms and
assumes that the messianic is inherently resistant to institutionalization. Messianic life
does not want to subvert or destroy established social and political orders with a view to
introducing new orders. Rather, it experiences and lives those orders through the ﬁlter
of the hōs mē. Thus, the Pauline revolution is radically diﬀerent from modern revolu-
tions, which are still included in the logic of sovereignty, and disempowers the
sovereign insomuch as the messianic does not battle against it. Messianic life is
revolutionary precisely because it gives up any attempt to destroy the established
order of social and political relationships. It maintains them and at the same time
deactivates them by means of the hōs mē. Agamben’s basic idea is that Pauline
messianism deactivates sovereignty.
As previously mentioned, however, severe ambiguities can be pointed out once one
tries to contextualize Agamben’s reading of Paul within the framework of the theory
elaborated in the Homo Sacer cycle. In Homo Sacer, Agamben clearly criticizes the
condition of the state of exception that deﬁnes modern and contemporary sovereignty.
Thus, it seems that Agamben evaluates the state of exception in a very negative way and
argues for the necessity of overcoming the indistinction between the law and exception –
between the state of nature and the state of law, between the law and fact – that is
increasingly aﬀecting the contemporary age.48 And yet, his evaluation of Pauline
katargēsis, which is explicitly said to be at least structurally analogous to the state of
exception – if not another manifestation of it – is largely positive, to the eﬀect that the
messianic, understood as a deactivating force, is considered by Agamben precisely the
dimension that should be experienced again if we want to overcome what he calls ‘[t]he
juridicizing of all human relations’.49
By such a ‘juridicizing’ Agamben means a condition in which the experience of
language has lost its original performativity and articulates itself by means of precepts
without any link to the living dimension of personal or interpersonal experience.50 In
other words, as a consequence of this ‘juridicizing’, language has become a dimension
detached from life. It is important to stress that when Agamben concentrates his
attention on the performativity of Pauline language, his analysis of what he calls
‘performativum ﬁdei’ presupposes an overriding issue, which is not only the religious
importance of linguistic performativity, but also the political and juridical relevance of
performativity.51 This crucial point becomes clear if one also takes into consideration
his archeology of oath, which is outlined in The Sacrament of Language. Here, too,
Agamben does not isolate the religious, the political, and the juridical, but tries to trace
these back to their roots.52 It is only against the background of this genealogical
approach that the relevance of the Pauline commentary for Agamben’s philosophical
program in general becomes apparent. If one decontextualizes the Pauline book, it is
not clear why Agamben pays much attention to the juridical and political signiﬁcance of
Paul’s apostleship, and why juridical, political, and religious aspects are investigated in
close conjunction with one another.
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The originality of Agamben’s messianic interpretation of Paul
Agamben’s political messianism becomes clearer when one compares his reading of
Paul with Heidegger’s apolitical interpretation of the Pauline letters. The comparison is
especially intriguing because the question of life is the primary focus of Heidegger’s
reading as well as of Agamben’s commentary. In other words, they both read the
Pauline letters through the lens of that question, but come to very diﬀerent conclusions.
It is, therefore, useful to elaborate on the substantial diﬀerences between Heidegger’s
phenomenological interpretation and Agamben’s commentary on the letter to the
Romans.
In Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of Paul, the Pauline letters are
deprived of any political import. The apolitical tone of Heidegger’s Pauline commentary
comes as no real surprise. It is symptomatic of the general apolitical tone that deﬁnes
his project of a phenomenological hermeneutics of factical life. Despite the intriguing
innovations Heidegger introduces in that project, his conception of factical life is highly
indebted to the epistemological debates that determined German thought at the end of
the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the
wake of the philosophical work of Dilthey and Husserl. This is attested to, among other
things, by the fact that Heidegger still considers ‘understanding’ (Verstehen) and
‘explication’ (Auslegung) as the main traits of factical life.53 As a matter of fact,
Heidegger ontologizes understanding and explication, with the result that they are
not just speciﬁc cognitive acts executed when interpreting a text or historical docu-
ments, but essential characteristics of human life as such, which becomes fully clear in
his analytic of existence.54 By combining Dilthey, Husserl, and Aristotle, that is, the
hermeneutically oriented philosophies of life, phenomenology, and ontology, Heidegger
formulates a new paradigm of life as facticity, but such an ontologization is still
developed on the basis of the epistemological categories of understanding and explica-
tion. This approach does not allow him to do justice to other fundamental character-
istics of human life. In the context of this article, it is worth noticing that it is especially
the political that disappears in Heidegger’s phenomenology of facticity. He does not pay
any attention to the phenomena of power, interest, and conﬂict, which are essential
components of any philosophical consideration of political phenomena.55
Intersubjectivity is present in the early Heidegger in the form of ‘the communal
world’ (Mitwelt).56 And yet, the relations between the subjects remain abstract and
void of any political signiﬁcance. In other words, Heidegger might address the ontolo-
gical foundations of social phenomena but is not able to open up new horizons for a
philosophical understanding of political phenomena, which is a consequence of the
predominantly epistemological nature of his ontological conception of facticity. This
approach becomes apparent in his interpretation of Paul as well. Heidegger devotes
much attention to the factical situation of Paul, that is, to his relation to Christian
communities.57 This dimension is very visible and comes to the fore in his reading very
well. However, he does not show any appreciation, not even implicitly, for the political
scope of Paul’s apostleship.
The predominantly epistemological orientation of Heidegger’s interpretation of the
Pauline letters can be ascertained especially in his use of phenomenological conceptual
frameworks he draws from Husserlian philosophy. It is especially the use of the
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threefold ‘content–relation–enactment’ pattern that attests to what Heidegger is actually
interested in, that is, an analysis of the intentional structures of religious lived
experiences.58 In accordance with this approach, Heidegger pays no attention to other
aspects of Paul’s apostleship. He neglects, for example, the historical and linguistic
context in which the Pauline letters are rooted. When Heidegger analyzes Pauline pistis,
he still considers it from a phenomenological viewpoint, so that pistis is regarded as a
lived experience that has to be analyzed in terms of content, relation, and enactment.59
The fact that Heidegger heavily emphasizes the role of the concrete enactment that
shapes the Pauline experience of faith does not change his basic epistemological
orientation. In other words, his analysis of the Pauline enactment of faith still remains
abstract, despite his claim that his phenomenological analysis is supposed to do justice
to the concrete facticity, historicity, and temporality that underlie Paul’s apostleship.
Thus, Heidegger’s interpretation of Paul is symptomatic of a philosophy that is not able
to face political and societal challenges, because the conceptual resources it is using does
not allow him to penetrate them.
By contrast, Agamben’s Pauline commentary cannot be regarded as a merely philo-
sophical or exegetical exercise precisely because his motivations are political in nature.
Agamben seems to be very close to Heidegger’s interpretation, especially as concerns
the attention devoted to the temporal shape of Paul’s apostleship.60 On closer inspec-
tion, compared to Heidegger’s reading, the paradigm shift Agamben introduces is quite
innovative because what changes is the lens through which Agamben reads Paul. The
question of life that is at work in Agamben’s reading of Paul no longer concerns life
insofar as it is viewed from a predominantly epistemological or ontological perspective,
but life with particular reference to its inherently political import, that is, life as it is
exposed to conﬂict and sovereign power.61 Agamben, too, puts much emphasis on the
concrete enactment of Paul’s apostleship, but his analysis turns out to be much richer
and more concrete than Heidegger’s because he substantiates his reading with sharp
and provocative analyses of historical, linguistic, and juridical facts. His analysis of
Pauline pistis is a paradigmatic example of his general approach to Paul. Pistis is no
longer a phenomenon of consciousness – as is still the case with Heidegger’s phenom-
enology of Pauline facticity – but a phenomenon that also requires historical, linguistic,
and anthropological investigations, which, among other things, allow one to see pistis in
the light of a more fundamental dimension, such as ‘prelaw’.62 Agamben’s innovative
approach lies precisely in his attempt to overcome a purely philosophical analysis, so
that he highlights the fascinating intersection of linguistic, anthropological, and histor-
ical elements that are at the core of Paul’s apostleship.
Accordingly, Agamben’s understanding of life has to be viewed in the light of a
completely diﬀerent philosophical landscape than Heidegger’s, one which is no longer
characterized by the epistemological debates in play in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century German thought, but by the biopolitical discourse that starts with Michel
Foucault and becomes fully apparent in contemporary Italian thinkers such as
Antonio Negri and Roberto Esposito. In a recent essay, Esposito provides convincing
arguments in his attempt to show the radical paradigm shift that deﬁnes biopolitics in
contemporary Italian thought.63 In the present context, I cannot elaborate on the
general thesis that is developed by Esposito, which touches the Italian philosophical
tradition as a whole. I am convinced, however, that he succeeds in showing the extent to
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which the conception of life at stake in Italian biopolitical discourse, including
Agamben, has little to do with a vague philosophy of life. Against the background of
this account of life, which emphasizes the political, one can understand the reasons why
Agamben attributes political signiﬁcance to Pauline messianism.
Yet, Agamben’s originality is also found in the way in which he attributes political
import to the Pauline letters. He presents Paul as one who is radically political, although
not in the traditional sense of the word. As already mentioned, Agamben’s Paul is
politically committed not because he adheres to a revolutionary program, but precisely
because he constitutes an alternative to modern politics. Indeed, the concept of use
Agamben sketches out in his Pauline commentary constitutes the core of his philoso-
phical program of the last few years. This circumstance attests to the crucial role the
Pauline book plays in the development of the theories outlined in Homo Sacer. In this
context, at least two pivotal works by Agamben should be mentioned, namely, The
Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life and The Use of Bodies, which con-
cludes the Homo Sacer cycle. An analysis of these two books goes beyond the scope of
this article. I would like to mention, however, the fact that if one views Agamben’s
Pauline book retrospectively, one can easily ascertain its central role. On the one hand,
The Time That Remains has to be understood against the background of the problems
Agamben focuses on in Homo Sacer. On the other hand, the Pauline commentary
anticipates a number of themes Agamben works out more precisely in The Highest
Poverty and The Use of Bodies.64 It is especially The Use of Bodies that clearly shows to
what extent Agamben’s commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans provided him with
crucial conceptual frameworks that helped him elaborate on the questions posed in
Homo Sacer. In the ﬁrst part of The Use of Bodies, Agamben analyzes the concept of use
by referring to a considerable number of ancient and modern sources. At ﬁrst sight,
Paul does not seem to play a determining role in this connection. Upon closer inspec-
tion, however, one can easily notice that Agamben recalls the main aspects of the
political messianism described in The Time That Remains by mentioning his reading of
the hōs mē.65 The hōs mē recurs in the Epilogue of The Use of Bodies, in which
Agamben outlines ‘a theory of destituent potential’.66 Here, Agamben eventually con-
siders Pauline messianism as ‘[a]n example of a destituent strategy that is neither
destructive nor constituent’,67 that is, as a form of life that can help us ﬁnd a way out
of the deadlock of sovereign power.
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